Update on serve or give

I have previously blogged about about the Full Federal Court decision in EFX17.

It was my view that the Full Court had it right and it was only procedurally fair that a requirement of “understanding” was implied in the giving of notices under the Migration Act. Unfortunately, the Minister didn’t hold the same view and appealed to the High Court . Even more unfortunately, the High Court agreed:

[25] When “giving” and “inviting” bear their ordinary meanings – respectively, of delivering and of requesting formally – with the implication that the delivery and request will be made in English, then it follows naturally that the expression “in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances” is only concerned with the method of delivery and request rather than the content. As senior counsel for the respondent properly accepted, a requirement that the Minister consider the capacity of a person to understand the written notice or invitation would require more than physical delivery.
….. and ….
[31] For these reasons, the majority of the Full Court erred in reasoning that the capacity of a person to understand the written notice, particulars, or invitation described in s 501CA(3) was relevant to whether the written notice and particulars had been given or whether the invitation to make representations had been made. 

However, it wasn’t all bad news for EFX17, because the High Court also found it wasn’t made sufficiently clear to EFX17 when the 28 day period for responding was reckoned:

[42] For these reasons, an invitation to make representations “within the period … ascertained in accordance with the regulations” must crystallise the period either expressly or by reference to correct objective facts from which the period can be ascertained on the face of the invitation such as “28 days from the day that you are handed this document”. The invitation in the letter from the delegate of the Minister did not do so. The notice of contention should therefore be upheld.

Back to the drawing board for the Minister!

Creative commons acknowledgement for the photograph.

Credibility reversed

This is not the first time that I have blogged about credibility, but I re-iterate that (adverse) credibility findings are the bane of the applicant lawyer’s life. The main reason is that usually (there are exceptions) an adverse credibility finding by a delegate is a finding of fact and can’t be judicially reviewed.

The reverse problem occurred in ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34 where although the protection visa applicant was unsuccessful (because the country information for Sri Lanka indicated there was low risk to him), his story had been found plausible by the delegate who interviewed him. That finding of (positive) credibility was reversed by the review authority who only listened to an audio recording of the interview. Although all the High Court judges allowed the appeal, there were some differences in reasoning.

The majority view was that it was effectively legally unreasonable for the review authority to reverse the credibility finding (at least without conducting a further interview).

The judgment of Nettle J (starting at [35]) sets out the procedural history and summarises some useful authorities about the role of appeal bodies (around [60]+) and raises an administrative law elephant in the room – the role of materiality in the law of unreasonableness. It’s fairly clear procedural unfairness has to be material, but it’s not so clear for unreasonableness. In fact there is a whole separate academic controversy on this point which is discussed  by UNSW academic Lisa Crawford in her blog post – https://auspublaw.org/2020/10/how-should-a-court-respond-to-an-immaterial-error-of-law/

There were other lurking issues about whether it was actually within power for the review authority to conduct a new interview because it’s power was limited to considering only “new evidence” and it’s unclear whether a second interview would fall into that category.

This is really another one of those cases where the outcome was good for the applicant but it raises a number of other unresolved legal issues.

Back to the future

A brief (recent) history of the regulation of the migration advice profession in Australia:

  1. In 1992, the Migration Amendment Act (No 3) 1992 (Cth) introduced, the Migration Agents Registration Scheme;
  2. Under that scheme, practising lawyers (who could previously give migration advice) were prohibited from doing so unless they were registered as migration agents;
  3. In 1994, two Sydney solicitors unsuccessfully challenged the registration scheme in the High Court, arguing that it was beyond legislative power, infringed the implied freedom of communication and contravenes the freedom of intercourse guaranteed by s.92 of the Constitution. See Cunliffe v Commonwealth (aka “Migration Agents case”) [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272;
  4. Over the years there were a number of productivity commission reports about whether dual regulation was required;
  5. Ultimately, in the early hours of today (22 March 2021), the Migration Amendment (Regulation of Migration Agents) Act 2020, came into force. The net effect of this is that: (a) lawyers can now provide immigration advice and assistance; (b) only non-lawyers need to be registered as migration agents; and (c) lawyers (at least those with unrestricted practising certificates) are not allowed to be registered;
  6. [please proceed to 1 above]

As a result of all that, my 20 years (to the day – from 21 March 2001 to 21 March 2021) registration (formerly 0101077) has come to end. Of course, I will continue to provide migration advice and assistance but as a lawyer not an agent. I have to make a few changes to the structure of my practise and this website and blog will remain.

Creative commons acknowledgment for the photograph.

Personal costs

There is specific power in section 486E Migration Act, to make personal costs orders (against advisers). As Rangiah J explained in SZTMH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 550, there is a balance. On one hand there is a clear intention to “discourage persons from encouraging others to make and continue unmeritorious applications in migration cases“, but on the other, “It is in the public interest that lawyers should not be deterred from pursuing their clients’ interests by fear of incurring a personal liability to their clients’ opponents“.

Relevantly 486E provides that:

(1)          A person must not encourage another person (the litigant) to commence or continue migration litigation in a court if:

(a)       the migration litigation has no reasonable prospect of success; and

(b)       either:

(i)          the person does not give proper consideration to the prospects of success of the migration litigation; or …..

In DAB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3957, the problem for the solicitor started when the appeal court dismissed his client’s appeal and made a finding that there had been no reasonable prospects of success.

What I find interesting about this case are the other two elements, namely: (a) there was “encouragement”; and (b) “no proper consideration”.

In relation to encouragement: at [64]…. “The lawyer’s conduct in formulating the grounds, filing the notice of appeal and certifying the grounds as having reasonable prospects of success, whilst asserting an entitlement to charge fees for legal services for doing those things are together sufficient to support an inference that a legal practitioner has “encouraged” the client to commence and continue the litigation in the requisite sense.  Of course it is open to the lawyer to adduce evidence to rebut the inference that otherwise arises.  However, in the absence of advice and instructions, it is reasonable to infer that the carriage of a case is wholly entrusted to the legal practitioner on the client’s reasonable assumption that the litigation has some prospect of success.”

In addition the solicitor had unsuccessfully made an identical argument in a different case and described his pursuit of the matter as a “passion”. “In light of that belief, it may be fairly inferred that the weaknesses in [solicitor’s] arguments were not apparent to him and, as a consequence, it is very unlikely that the weaknesses were made known to the appellant in the form of correct and measured advice concerning the prospect of success of the litigation.” (at [67]).

In relation to “proper consideration”: at [78] Of particular concern is [solicitor’s] assumption that the primary judge (and this Court) could and should receive evidence that was not before the Authority so as to reach a different conclusion on a factual question to that reached by the Authority …. That aspect of the argument alone indicates that any consideration that was given to the merits by [solicitor] proceeded from a flawed understanding of fundamental legal principles. Any consideration founded on that flawed understanding could not be “proper consideration” for the purposes of s 486E of the Act.

[79] There may be a category of case in which a legal practitioner makes an error of judgment or proceeds from an understandable misapprehension of legal principle or in ignorance of recently decided authority or recently made amendments to the Act.  A finding that the lawyer has not given “proper consideration” in such cases may be more problematic.  I do not consider this case to fall within that category.

Creative commons acknowledgment for the photograph.

New Zealanders

Good news for NZ Citizens who were usually resident in Australia prior to 19 February 2017. There is now a special "New Zealand stream" in the skilled visa category. Full details are in the Minister's press release. However, at the time of lodging the application,...

De-regulation

On 21 June 2017, the Migration Amendment (Regulation of Migration Agents) Bill 2017 was introduced into the House of Representatives. One of the purposes of the bill is to remove the requirement that lawyers who provide migration advice have to be registered as...

Training Benchmarks

One of the changes made to the ENS (and temporary working visa) is the replacement of the training benchmark with a "flat fee". Over the years collating documents to show compliance with the training benchmark has been a difficult task for many clients. I can only...

The end of the 457

The following summary came to me as a notice circulated by the Migration Institute of Australia: Any 457 sponsorship, nomination or visa applications that are NOT listed in the relevant Instrument IMMI 17/040  (check any notes against your occupation) and NOT decided...

New Entrepreneur Visa

Migration Amendment (Entrepreneur Visas and Other Measures) Regulation 2016, creates these new streams within the Business Innovation and Investment visa class, to provide a pathway to permanent residence for: high calibre entrepreneurs with financial backing from...

A National Disgrace

The Australian Senate’s Education and Employment References Committee has released its 355 page report on the impact of Australia’s temporary work visa holders on the Australian labour market and on temporary work visa holders. The report, entitled A National...

Self 457 Sponsorship

Compare the following: The DIBP policy manual (called PAMS3) was updated in November 2015 to try and preclude applicants from applying for “self sponsored” 457 visas. Position created to secure a migration outcome (PAM3: Genuine Position) The intent of the 457 program...

Innovation Agenda

This week the government released its National Innovation and Science Agenda Report. One of the recommendations includes: We will bring entrepreneurs and other innovative talent to Australia by: Introducing a new Entrepreneurs Visa for up and coming entrepreneurial...

Charging for a Migration Outcome

The Migration Amendment (Charging for a Migration Outcome) Act 2015 came into effect today (30 Nov 2015).  The legislation introduces a new criminal and civil penalty regime that will make it unlawful for a person to ask for, receive, offer or provide payment or other...

Fraud or unreasonableness?

The cases of Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 and Minister for Home Affairs v CHK16 [2020] HCA 46 highlight an interesting application of legal unreasonableness to what appears to be case of fraud.

It was common ground that the applicants in these cases (and probably about 40 others) were the victims of fraud by their migration agent (who was also a lawyer). She didn’t tell her clients that she intended to use a pro-forma submission to the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”)(which reviews claims for asylum for maritime arrivals).

She apparently didn’t do a great job with the pro-forma because:

In the case of CHK16, the agent, acting fraudulently, provided submissions where the entirety of the personal circumstances concerned the wrong person. [the details for DUA16 were partly correct]. The Authority was unaware of the agent’s fraud. The Authority noticed that the submissions concerned the wrong person yet did not seek to obtain the correct submissions and any new information about the correct applicant. Instead, it had regard to the submissions concerning generic information and legal issues but disregarded the information concerning the personal circumstances of the wrong person.

So what are the legal consequences of this?

  1. firstly, as a ground of judicial review, fraud must affect a particular duty, function, or power of the Authority. It is not sufficient to assert that fraud might be said to affect the process of decision-making in some abstract sense. Although the Authority requested (pursuant to a Practice Direction) submissions and received false ones, the Court said that this did not affect the Authority’s power to make the request. No duty, function or power was affected in any adverse way; and
  2. However, all was not lost for the Appellants because the Authority was aware that the information it received was in relation to a different person. In those circumstances it was held to be legally unreasonable not to request the correct information.

This is interesting because the general proposition is that “there is no general obligation on the Authority to advise referred applicants of their opportunities to present new information. Nor is there any general obligation upon the Authority to get new information. This is so even if the submissions are hopeless, or if they contain errors, even major errors, about facts or law.” However, all powers have to be exercised “legally reasonably” and  “the failure of an administrative decision-maker to make inquiry into factual matters which can readily be determined and are of critical significance to a decision made under statutory authority, has sometimes been said to support characterisation of the decision as an exercise of power so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised it.” A very interesting balance between the two, but the circumstances of these applicants was said to be “extreme’.

Creative commons acknowledgment for the photograph.

New Zealanders

Good news for NZ Citizens who were usually resident in Australia prior to 19 February 2017. There is now a special "New Zealand stream" in the skilled visa category. Full details are in the Minister's press release. However, at the time of lodging the application,...

De-regulation

On 21 June 2017, the Migration Amendment (Regulation of Migration Agents) Bill 2017 was introduced into the House of Representatives. One of the purposes of the bill is to remove the requirement that lawyers who provide migration advice have to be registered as...

Training Benchmarks

One of the changes made to the ENS (and temporary working visa) is the replacement of the training benchmark with a "flat fee". Over the years collating documents to show compliance with the training benchmark has been a difficult task for many clients. I can only...

The end of the 457

The following summary came to me as a notice circulated by the Migration Institute of Australia: Any 457 sponsorship, nomination or visa applications that are NOT listed in the relevant Instrument IMMI 17/040  (check any notes against your occupation) and NOT decided...

New Entrepreneur Visa

Migration Amendment (Entrepreneur Visas and Other Measures) Regulation 2016, creates these new streams within the Business Innovation and Investment visa class, to provide a pathway to permanent residence for: high calibre entrepreneurs with financial backing from...

A National Disgrace

The Australian Senate’s Education and Employment References Committee has released its 355 page report on the impact of Australia’s temporary work visa holders on the Australian labour market and on temporary work visa holders. The report, entitled A National...

Self 457 Sponsorship

Compare the following: The DIBP policy manual (called PAMS3) was updated in November 2015 to try and preclude applicants from applying for “self sponsored” 457 visas. Position created to secure a migration outcome (PAM3: Genuine Position) The intent of the 457 program...

Innovation Agenda

This week the government released its National Innovation and Science Agenda Report. One of the recommendations includes: We will bring entrepreneurs and other innovative talent to Australia by: Introducing a new Entrepreneurs Visa for up and coming entrepreneurial...

Charging for a Migration Outcome

The Migration Amendment (Charging for a Migration Outcome) Act 2015 came into effect today (30 Nov 2015).  The legislation introduces a new criminal and civil penalty regime that will make it unlawful for a person to ask for, receive, offer or provide payment or other...

Re-cancellation

Visas can be cancelled on the basis that the holder is not of good character under section 501 of the Migration Act. This usually means that the person has a “substantial criminal record”. The decision to cancel is discretionary and subject to review in the AAT (usually). So what happens when:

  • a permanent visa is cancelled after the visa holder is convicted on several sexual assault charges and sentenced to imprisonment;
  • he successfully seeks merit review in the AAT (so that the cancellation is set aside);
  • then a few years later, he had a drink driving offence which again brought him to the Minister’s attention and resulted in the second cancellation of his visa. The drink driving offence by itself was not enough to trigger “bad character” but was taken into consideration with his previous offending.

He again seeks review of the decision and ultimately, the High Court (in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Makasa [2021] HCA 1) frames the question as (at [44]):

The determinative question therefore becomes whether, and if so when, the power conferred by s 501(2) of the Act, having once been exercised by the Minister or a delegate in the first instance or re-exercised by the AAT on review not to cancel a visa, can be re‑exercised by the Minister or a delegate to cancel the visa.

and the answer is (at [56]):

The result, in short, is that a decision of a delegate or the AAT not to cancel a visa made in the exercise of the power conferred by s 501(2) of the Act on the basis of facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a visa holder does not pass the character test is final, subject only to ministerial override in the exercise of the specific power conferred by s 501A.

This basically means the power can only be used once. I will leave you to read the decision for all the analysis that led to that conclusion (which is more complicated than it first appears).

Creative commons acknowledgment for the photograph.